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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 23860 
Defendant-Appellant seeks a judicial determination of his 
righ~ t0 continue to operate an outdoor advertising sign. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Second District Court, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan 
presiding, dismissed Defendant-Appellant's appeal from the 
decision of the Utah Transportation Commission as not being 
timely. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have his appeal reinstated 
in the Lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Nine months after a hearing before Commissioner Charles 
Ward of the Utah Transportation Commission on December 9, 1976, 
the Commission as a whole adopted a resolution declaring Defendant-
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Appellant's signs to be in violation of the Utah Outdoor 
Advertising Act. Twenty-five days after notice ~f this 
action, on October 25, 1977, Defendant-Appellant filed his 
appeal in the Second District Court. That Court granted 
Plaintiff-Respondent's motion to dismiss on the grounds that 
Defendant-Appellant's appeal was not timely. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
THIS APPEAL DUE TO APPELLANT'S COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE 30-DAY FROM NOTICE OF DECISION 
RULE EXPRESSLY ADOPTED BY THE UTAH DEPART-
MENT OF TRANSPORTATION. 
Tne sole issue before this court is whtth~r or not a 
notice of appeal filed 25 days from Appellant's receipt of the 
decision of the Utah Transportation Commission complies with 
the letter and spirit of Utah law and will afford Appellant 
the opportunity to have his legal rights adjudicated by a 
court of law. Both this court and the U~ah Department of 
Transportation have said it does. 
In a recent case interpreting the right to appeal from 
the decision of the Transportation Commission. NATIONAL 
ADVERTISING CO. v. UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, 26 U. 2d 132, 
486 P. Zd 383 (1971), this court found that Rule 81 (d) U.R.C.P. 
applied in determining che period in which an appeal can be 
taken from a decision of the Transportation Commission. Rule 
Sl(d) provides that: 
-2-
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"These Rules shall apply to the practice 
and procedure in appealing from or obtain-
ing a review of any order, ruling or other 
action ~fan administrative board or agency, 
except 1nsofar as the specific statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal 
or review is in conflict with these Rules." 
Due to the qualifying language in the last sentence and the fact 
that the Legislature amended Section 27-12-136.9 U.C.A. (1953) 
which provides the procedure for appeal from the Transportation 
Commission, it might be argued that Rule 8l(d) no longer 
applies. This deserves close scrutiny. 
Previous to the amendment by the Legislature, Section 
27-12-136.9 did not specify any time limit within which a party 
would have to appeal. It now reads as follows: 
"The decision of the col1lllission may be 
appealed to the District Court in the 
county in which the sign is located .. 
Appeals shall be taken within 30 days of 
the commission's decision by filing a 
notice of appeal and sending a copy of the 
notice to the commission." 
This new language at the end arguably restricts the time 
to appeal td a 30-day period commencing with the decision of the 
commission. If this is so, then Appellant's appeal would have 
been late. However, the Transportation Commission itself has 
answered this argument in their Rules adopted under the Utah 
Administrative Rules Act. The Utah Transportation Department 
Regulations ASS-30-l :l4c dealing with appeals from hearing 
decisions contains the following language: 
"Notice of appeal from the Commission decision 
to the District Court for review shall be in 
writing and a copy of the Notice of Appeal shall 
-3-
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be sent to the Director of the Utah Department 
of Transportation postmarked or filed prior 
to the 30th day from the Commission findings, 
conclusions and decision, and as rovided in 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 81 d). 
(Emphasis added.) 
Herein the Commission has expressly adopted the holding in 
National Advertising and thereby made themselves subject to the 
holding of this court relative to the interpretation of those 
rules. The only remaining question is whether or not the 
Rules of Civil Procedure dictate a different rule from the 30-
days from decision interpretation. 
In the Brief filed by the Attorney General's Office in 
support of their motion to dismiss Appellant's appeal in the 
District Co~rt it is conceded that where the Rules of Civil 
Procedure do apply, that Rule 73(h) is that rule in that it 
provides for appeals from lower tribunals to district courts. 
Appellant concedes that this is the proper interpretation. 
That Rule provides: 
"An appeal may be taken to the district court 
from a final judgment rendered in a city court 
within one month after notice of the entry of 
such judgment. 
Although the language is clear, this court expressly interpreted 
this language in BUCKNER v. MAIN REALTY & INS. CO., 4 U. 2d 124, 
288 P. 2d 786 (1955), and found that it required a 30-day 
from notice appeal time. Given the application of this section 
to the appeal in question, Appellant's appeal filed 25 days 
from receipt of notice was timely. and the district court had 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
-4-
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POINT II 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO POINT I, THIS COURT SHOULD 
ANNOUNCE A RULE OF LIBERAL INTERPRETATION 
WITH REFERENCE TO APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRA-
TIVE BODIES. 
In a dissenting opinion in, MARSH v. UTAH HOMES, INC., 
17 U. 2d 248, 408 P. 2d 906 (1965), Chief Justice Crockett 
stated the following: 
"One of the purposes of our new Rules of 
Civil Procedure was to eliminate rigidities 
which had become engrafted into procedure 
and to provide some degree of liberality 
where that is necessary to effectuate justice." 
He further stated that: 
"I am both aware of and committed to the 
advisability generally of orderli~ess of 
procedure by adhering to rules. Nevertheless, 
it seems to me that it is often a mistake 
to attempt to see all of the law in the strict 
and literal application of one single statute, 
particularly where it results in depriving a 
party of a legal right or an opportunity to 
have it adjudicated, whereas, following other 
provisions of the law would avoid such an 
arbitrary result." 
In the case of ADAMSON v. BROCKBANK, 112 U. 52, 185 P. 2d 
264 (1947), this court held that the right to appeal is such a 
valuable right and that it is presumed to be available. As such 
it would be manifestly unjust for this court to deny Appellant's 
right to have his day in court when the path to allow this right 
is so clear and will only be lost if this court adopts a strained 
and restrictive reading of the relevant language. A liberal 
construction is also required by virtue of Section 68-3-2 U,C.A. 
( 1953). 
-5-
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As mentioned earlier, Rule 73(h) U.R.C.P. provides 
for the procedure for appealing to the district courts. When 
compared with Rule 73(a) which deals with appeals to this 
court, it becomes clear that a less restrictive rule was 
intended. In Rule 73(a) a strict 30-day from decision rule 
is applied, but provision is made for relief from that strict 
rule due to excusable neglect. In recognition of the differ-
ences between appeals from district courts and that from less 
structured and formal bodies, namely the lack of dockets and 
the predictability of the time when a decision will be reached, 
Rule 73(h) adopts a 30-day from notice rule, thereby guarantee-
ing the losing party at least 30 days in which to perfect his 
appeal. Gh<en the likewise informal procedure before the 
Transportation Commission there is certainly no reason to 
restrict the right to appeal even more harshly than that from 
the District Court by requiring a 30-day from decision rule 
and not providing any relief for failure to learn of the 
decision. 
The facts surrounding the present case and the general 
procedure of the Transportation Commission underscore the need 
for flexibility and a liberal interpretation. As mentioned 
previously, it was a full ~ine ~onths from the time the 
hearing was held before Commissioner Ward and the decision 
of the Commission. During that time Appellant had no way of 
knowing when the decision would be rendered. According to the 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Commission Secretary, Ronald A. Fernley, the procedure for 
adopting a decision is as fol:ows. The Commissioner who heard 
the case drafts a resolution which is considered by the 
Commission as a whole and either adopted or rejected. This 
decision is then forwarded to the division which supervises 
this area. This department then prepares the order and 
notifies the owner of the signs. In the present case it took 
nearly 14 days from the date of the decision before Appellant 
was notified. Given the complicated procedure outlined, this 
was likely very quick action and it is entirely possible that 
a given person would never learn of the decision until his 
right to appeal had run and if the statute is read restrictively 
the right to appeal would have been lost for failure to take 
independent steps to learn of the Commission's actions. Such 
action would be extremely difficult, however, since the deci-
sions of the Commission are not published in any newspaper 
of general circulation and the Commission itself does not 
maintain any docket of its decisions. In the present case, the 
sign owner, who, by the way, was the only person notified, 
looked at the date of the letter notifying him of the decision, 
September 26, 1977, and mistakenly read the date of the 
decision, September 16, 1977, to be one and the same; thereby 
leading to the unfortunate and time-consuming process we are 
currently engaged in. 
-7-
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It is certainly apparent that the argument for 
greater flexibility applies with great force in the context 
of administrative hearings and post-hearing procedure. We 
are not dealing here with a court where the post-trial 
procedures are well defined and predictable, but rather with 
an area where the Legislature intended that matters be handled 
informally, thereby allowing the parties to iron out their 
differences without formal motions and rules. 
Given the confusion and need for flexibility this 
court should hold that Appellant's appeal was timely and 
reinstate it in the District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
By virtue of the clear application of Rule 73(h) and 
the 30-day from notice rule therein announced when coupled 
with the inherent need for flexibility in hearing and post-
hearing procedure when dealing with administrative bodies, 
this court should find that an appeal filed 25 days from the 
date of notice of the decision of the Utah Transportation 
Commission was timely and reinstate this appeal in the 
District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHEN M. HARMSEN 
350 South 400 East, 4G-l 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were served on STEPHEN J. SORENSON, 
Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 
115 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
___ day of , 1978. 
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